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Abstract 
 
Nine of the ten recessions since WWII have been preceded by relatively large and sudden 
increases in the price of oil. In this paper, I use time series analysis to forecast GDP 
growth using oil prices. I use the methodology from Hamilton (2009), and extend the 
dataset through 2010. Impulse response functions are used to analyze the historical 
performance of the model’s one-year-ahead forecasts. In April, 2011, the International 
Monetary Fund changed its forecast of 2011 GDP growth in the U.S. from 3.0% to 2.8% 
largely due to persistently high oil prices. My model suggests that the price increase in 
2011Q1 will lead to growth of 2% in 2011. Furthermore, my model predicts that a 54% 
increase in crude oil prices during the second quarter of 2011 will lead the U.S. into a 
double dip recession
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1. Introduction 
The last time you pulled up to a red light and made a right turn, you probably were not 
thinking about oil shocks—but if not for the 1973 oil crisis, some states might still 
require you to wait for a green light to turn right. When the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) instituted an embargo on oil to countries deemed to be pro-
Israel, the global oil supply fell 7.5% (Hamilton 2010). The effects of the 1973 Oil Crisis 
were incredibly far reaching. The U.S., led by Richard Nixon at the time, set the goal of 
reducing energy consumption by 25% (Forrester 1984). Congress passed a temporary 
nation-wide speed limit of 55 miles per hour which lasted until 1987 (Frum 2010). The 
State of Oregon banned the use of Christmas lights and some commercial lighting (Frum 
2010). Major developed countries such as the UK, Germany, Switzerland, Norway and 
Italy prohibited flying, boating or driving on Sundays and some countries including Italy 
experimented with an even-odd scheme where only those with odd license plate numbers 
could buy gasoline on odd numbered days (Frum 2010). Thousands of U.S. gas stations 
were closed due to lack of supply, with many more deciding whether to ration the 
gasoline or sell the supply as fast as possible to minimize arguments with angry 
customers (Hamilton 2010). The hours of waiting in lines and the fear of the American 
lifestyle being threatened by instability in the Middle East, had a strong effect on 
Americans. In 1975, Congress passed the Energy Policy and Savings Act to establish a 
strategic reserve of petroleum to better prepare for oil supply shocks (Zador 1983). The 
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Act also required states to develop energy conservation plans1, and required legalization 
of the gasoline-saving right turn on red.2 
In April 2011, crude oil prices reached a two and a half year high because of 
political turmoil in Libya.3  President Obama addressed the issue of oil prices in a March 
11, 2011 news conference.4 He pointed out that though we use 7% less oil than we did in 
2005, we are still very dependent on foreign oil, controlling 2% of the world’s oil but 
using over 25%.5 The U.S. imports over 50% of the crude oil it uses6. Though none 
comes directly from Libya, European countries import crude oil from Libya which is 
shipped to the U.S., refined and then shipped back to Europe.7 On April 11, the 
International Monetary Fund changed its forecast for 2011 growth in the U.S. from 3.0% 
to 2.8%, largely due to oil price increases.8 On April 21, with prices still rising, the 
Justice Department announced an investigation into fraud in the setting of gasoline 
prices.9 There was no reason to suspect fraud, and the notion that the U.S. Government 
could lower the short term price of oil is unrealistic.10 Nevertheless, with consumers 
angry over rising costs, the government has found itself desperate to pursue anything 
which would appease consumers.  
                                                     
1
 An additional Federal Regulation in 1992 required legalization of right turns on red in order for a state to 
receive funding for energy conservation plans. Source: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/42/6322.html  
2
 Analysis from Zador (1983) suggests that the adoption of right-turn laws increased right turn crashes by 
18%.  
3
 Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-11/imf-cuts-2011-u-s-growth-forecast-on-oil-
lackluster-pace-of-job-gains.html  
4
 Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/11/news-conference-president  
5
 Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/11/news-conference-president  
6
 Source: http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/foreign_oil_dependence.cfm 
7
 Source: http://money.msn.com/how-to-budget/article.aspx?post=df31d82d-ff74-4a56-9cdc-1302039b3a02  
8
 Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-11/imf-cuts-2011-u-s-growth-forecast-on-oil-
lackluster-pace-of-job-gains.html 
9
 Source: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/21/us-usa-energy-fraud-idUSTRE73K5FS20110421  
10
 Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/obamas-gas-price-
charade/2011/04/22/AFJLFGQE_blog.html  
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While oil prices are clearly important, frequently making front page news, there is 
a large amount of disagreement in the literature about the effects of oil prices on the U.S. 
GDP. The instances where oil prices rise significantly in a short period of time, called oil 
shocks, are of particular interest. The purpose of this paper is to examine how past oil 
shocks have impacted the economy and predict how the economy will fare in light of 
recent oil prices. Using the Hamilton (2008) methodology of forecasting with time series 
analysis, I use the impulse response functions from oil price shocks to predict the 
response of real GDP. The paper proceeds as follows: In the literature review, I describe 
how oil became an integral part of the economy, and how oil shocks and recessions have 
coincided since WWII. I highlight the disagreements in the literature about the effect of 
oil shocks on the economy and the asymmetry of price increases and decreases. 
Extending Hamilton’s sample, I build a similar forecasting model to predict the impact of 
oil prices on real GDP. I compare the one-year-ahead forecasts of the model for different 
oil shocks, and estimate the path of GDP given the oil shock in the first quarter of 2011.  
 2. Literature Review 
 
In this section, I review the literature on oil shocks. I examine the history of oil before 
and after WWII, and then explain the theories of how oil prices impact the economy. I 
examine the issue of exogeneity of oil shocks, and show the construction of the model I 
use in the rest of the paper.  
2.1 Oil Shocks 
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An oil shock refers to any time that oil prices rise significantly in a short period of time. 
The causes and consequences of oil shocks have been shown to have generally similar 
effects on industrialized countries. Kilian (2007) found that across G7 countries, all of 
which except Canada are net oil importers,11 oil price increases are generally followed by 
a hit to real GDP in the second year after the shock. He also noted a spike in inflation 
peaking three to four quarters after the oil price shock. There is a branch of literature that 
studies the effects of oil shocks on inflation, but this paper focuses on the relationship 
between oil prices and real U.S. GDP.  
There is substantial disagreement in the literature over how much oil prices affect 
the U.S. economy and through which mechanisms the effects are realized. Blanchard and 
Gali (2007) argued that the economy today is better able to adapt than in the past, so 
shocks have less effect now. The Blanchard and Gali argument made sense in light of the 
significant price increases from 2002-2007, with no commensurate recession.  Nordhaus 
(2007) too argued that the effects were small for 2002-2007 because they were gradual. 
Figure 1 shows that the energy intensity in the U.S. economy, measured the share of 
energy purchases in total expenditures, has been cut in half since the 1970s (Blinder 
2009). Edelstein and Kilian (2007) found a declining effect of energy price shocks on the 
aggregate measures of consumption—in a sample from 1970-2006, a 1% increase in 
energy prices was found to lead to a 0.30% decline in real consumption one year later for 
the first half of the sample, but only 0.08% for the second half. Blanchard and Gali 
(2007) attributed the lack of recession to the above reasons, in combination with an 
                                                     
11
 The UK exported oil until 2006 when the country became a net importer. Source: U.S. Energy 
Information Agency: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/oiltrade.html 
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automobile industry which had decreased in size since the previous shocks, and a Federal 
Reserve that established credibility in keeping inflation low.  
Unfortunately, the recession of 2007-2008 presented a challenge to the story that 
the economy was now relatively immune to energy price socks. Although the energy 
intensity had fallen significantly since the 1970s, Kilian (2009) notes it began increasing 
again after 2000, as displayed in Figure 1.12 The energy intensity was 8% in 1970 and 
steadily rose to a high of 13.7% in 1981. It declined to its low of 5.9% in 1999 but by 
2007 the value was back up to 8.8% and Hamilton (2009) argues that this increasing 
energy intensity amplified the effect of the oil price shock. He argues that with the earlier 
increases people could afford to keep buying energy, but then by the end of 2007, they 
could no longer afford to and a threshold was reached which set in motion the impending 
collapse of the housing market and the financial crisis. Hamilton (2009) argues that there 
would not have been a recession in 2007-2008 in the absence of oil price increases.  
The Hamilton claim, however, does not belittle the housing bubble and the 
collapse of the financial industry as the cause for the Great Recession. His argument is as 
follows: Demand was rising globally from 2002-2007 and due to the supply increases in 
2004-2006, the price effects of the increasing demand weren’t realized until the 
production slowed in 2007-2008. Since the housing market had already been creating a 
drag on the economy, the rapid oil prices tipped the economy into the housing crisis13 and 
                                                     
12
 The shaded areas on this graph correspond to recessions. 
13
 Hamilton (2009) notes the interaction between oil prices and housing: home prices in suburbs fell far 
more in suburbs that require long commutes via automobile, than in neighborhoods closer to cities.   
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financial meltdown. I now take a step back to examine how oil became such an integral 
part of the U.S. economy that a respected economist could claim that oil prices caused the 
largest economic recession since the Great Depression.   
2.2 History of Oil before WWII 
In 1859, Edwin Drake produced the first commercially available crude oil in the U.S. 
(Hamilton 2010). A tax on alcohol added in 1862 made alcohol-derived illuminants too 
expensive to produce. Consequently, alternative illuminants made with petroleum 
became the norm. After the civil war, the oil industry expanded but still only accounted 
for 0.4% of GNP in 1900.  
In the early twentieth century, the use of petroleum evolved, and petroleum 
products became more integrated into various parts of the economy. Though petroleum 
based illuminants were largely replaced with electric lighting, oil became widely used for 
commercial and industrial heating. Additionally, oil was used to power trains and, later 
on, for motor vehicles.  
After the Great Depression, the oil industry changed in two distinct ways: it was 
more regulated, and it became largely controlled by Texas. With the discovery of the 
enormous East Texas field, which started producing oil in 1930, Texas became a major 
part of the oil industry. The state would produce 40% of the crude in the U.S. from 1935-
1960 (Hamilton 2010). The Texas Railroad Commission (TRC), the state agency 
governing petroleum use in Texas, initiated regulations which both mandated proper field 
management and restricted supply to keep prices high. The TRC had a widespread 
influence—in the post World War II era, global crude oil prices were quoted based on 
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prices in the Gulf of Mexico. The TRC would keep nominal prices constant and raise 
them in response to external supply disruptions. 
2.3 Behavior of oil prices after WWII 
From 1948-1972, the TRC would forecast demand for the upcoming month and set 
production levels to meet the demand (Hamilton 2010). After 1973, the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries became the major player in the world oil market, 
changing production levels in response to fluctuations in demand.  
Hamilton (2008) notes that nine of the ten U.S. recessions since WWII have 
occurred after increases in oil prices. A recession is typically two consecutive quarters of 
negative GDP growth, but the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) has 
flexibility in setting the dates. The NBER defines a recession as:  
A significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting 
more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, 
industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales.14 
Figure 2 displays the oil shocks.15 The following events are responsible for the large oil 
shocks: 
Korean War: Oil prices were frozen by order of the Office of Price Stabilization from 
January 25, 1950 to February 13, 1953.  
1956-1957 Suez Crisis: Israel, Britain and France invaded the Suez Canal, preventing 
transportation of oil through the canal and movement of Iraqi oil transportation through 
                                                     
14
 Source: http://www.nber.org/cycles.html 
15
 Shaded areas in this graph correspond to recessions. 
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Syria. The global production fell by 10.1%, the largest percentage drop of any oil shock 
(Hamilton 2010). 
OPEC embargo: Syria and Egypt attacked Israel on October 6, 1973 and the U.S. 
provided weapons and supplies to assist Israel. On October 17, the Arab members of 
OPEC announced an embargo to pro-Israel countries. The overall decrease in global 
production was 7.5% from September to November.  
Iranian Revolution:  There were large scale protests in Iran, including oil sector 
employees. The result was a drop of 7% of world production from October 1978 to 
January 1979. Saudi Arabia was able to increase production which made up for a third of 
the lost production in Iran.   
1980-1981 Iran-Iraq war.   When Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, the lost 
production from both countries caused a 7.2% drop in global production. 
First Gulf War: When Iraq invaded Kuwait, production from both countries dropped. 
The two countries accounted for 9% of world supply, and the disruption caused prices to 
double. There were no long lines or rationing of oil in the U.S., because Saudi Arabia was 
able to increase production to bring back levels back to the pre-war levels within a few 
months.   
The Iraq War beginning in 2003 and the instability in Venezuela in 2002 did not 
coincide with subsequent recessions. This led Blanchard and Gali (2007) to believe that 
the country had improved its ability to respond to oil shocks. In the following section, I 
take a closer look at the mechanism through which oil shocks are believed to affect GDP.  
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2.4 Mechanism of effects 
 
Demand for oil is largely determined by income; as an economy grows, more oil is 
needed to fuel growth. The natural log of oil consumption plotted against the log of real 
GDP has a slope of 1.2 from 1949-1961 and 1.04 from 1961-1973 (Hamilton, 2009). This 
slope is the income elasticity of demand, in other words if income increases by 1%, from 
1949-1961, on average oil consumption increased by 1.2%16. The elasticity falls to 0.47 
for the period from 1985-1997, which Hamilton (2009) attributes to either the “delayed 
consequences of increased energy conservation following the 1970s oil shocks” or the 
natural process of the income elasticity falling as a country gets more developed.   
The price elasticity of demand, which measures how much demand will fall for a 
1% increase in price, is also an important metric. Since individuals and firms are 
relatively unable or unwilling to change consumption of oil, the price elasticity of 
demand for oil is low. Hamilton (2009) estimates the short-run price elasticity of demand 
for gasoline to be 0.21-0.34 from 1975-1980 but only 0.034-0.077 in 2001-2006, 
reflecting an even greater lack of adjustment to price changes.  
The energy intensity in the U.S. economy has been falling since the 1970s. With 
an income elasticity below 1, when income increases oil, consumption increases by a 
smaller percentage, so the energy intensity falls. However, with low short-run price 
elasticity, when the price of oil goes up the demand falls by less than the price increase 
and the energy intensity rises (Hamilton 2009). 
                                                     
16
 These percentages are calculated as the difference in the natural log of consumption.  
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One argument for the mechanism of supply disruptions affecting the economy is 
the factor share argument. A firm’s production function Y can be expressed in terms of 
labor (N), capital (K) and energy (E), with the following formula: 
   , , 	
. 
If P is the nominal price, W is wages, Q is the price of energy, and r is the 
nominal interest rate, profits are given by: 
      	. 
Firms will use energy up to the point where marginal product of energy equals the 
price of energy. The partial derivative of F with respect to energy is given by QE/PY. 
Therefore, the elasticity of output for a change in energy use can be predicted by the 
energy intensity.17 The factor share framework is useful for conceptualizing the 
macroeconomic effects of oil price fluctuations on firms. However, based on a survey of 
the literature, Hamilton (2008) asserts that  
The key mechanism whereby oil shocks affect the economy is through a 
disruption in spending by consumers and firms on other goods [and] if this 
disruption fails to occur, the effects on the economy are indeed governed by the 
factor share argument. 
 
Edelstein and Kilian (2007) break down the effects of energy price changes on 
consumption behavior into four components and test the contribution from each. The first 
component measures the effect of a decrease in spending of discretionary income. Due to 
the low price elasticity of demand for oil, consumers will continue to spend on oil when 
                                                     
17
 This is a modified version of the factor share argument layed out in Hamilton (2008) 
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prices rise and have less left over for other spending. This effect is bounded by the energy 
intensity, because even if the elasticity of demand is zero, one still only needs to spend a 
certain amount on energy. The second effect is the “uncertainty effect” (Edelstein and 
Kilian 2007) of consumers putting off decisions about purchases of durable goods, which 
may be difficult to reverse, until there is more certainty about oil prices. Hamilton (2003) 
points out that a change in oil prices leads to hesitation in consumption:  
How energy-efficient should your appliances, windows and insulation be?...When 
energy prices and availability are as uncertain as they were in early 1974, it is 
rational to postpone such commitments until better information is available. 
The response to consumption of durable goods is five times larger than that predicted by 
the energy share argument (Hamilton 2009). However, Edelstein and Kilian find no 
evidence of the uncertainty effect directly. The third effect is the decrease in overall 
spending which goes instead towards “precautionary saving” as consumers worry about 
uncertain oil prices. The fourth effect is the “operating cost effect” which is the decrease 
in spending on durable goods that require energy used as a compliment, such as 
automobiles. Edelstein and Kilian (2007) also tested for indirect “allocative effects” due 
to changing composition in the sectors of the economy. For example, if automobiles 
become more costly to produce, industry specific capital and labor may be unused. They 
were unable to find evidence for this reallocation effect, but are not surprised because of 
the diminishing role of the U.S. automobile industry. Other studies, such as Lee and Ni 
(2002) however, find that the reallocation amplifies the negative effect on the economy. 
The ability to understand the relative contributions of each effect is critical for 
extending the model into the future. For example, if the relative contribution from 
14 
 
 
 
automobile spending is known, then it can be scaled by the size of the automobile 
industry when applied to predicting future consequences. Edelstein and Kilian (2007) 
find that a 1% increase in energy prices leads to a decrease of 0.15% in real consumption 
one year later.  
2.5 The Exogeneity of Oil Shocks Issue 
 
If oil shocks and GDP growth are found to have a statistically significant relationship in 
the subsequent periods, then there is a historical correlation between the sets of values. In 
order to say that oil shocks actually cause the change in growth rate of GDP, it is 
necessary to say that oil shocks are determined exogenously, that is, by external forces 
outside of the model.  
 Due to the Texas Railroad Commission’s setting of prices to meet forecasted 
demand, Hamilton (2003) argues that only supply disruptions changed price from 1948 to 
1972. Since these supply disruptions are caused by political activity in the Middle East, 
Hamilton argues that oil prices were exogenous during this period. Hamilton (2003) notes 
that the argument about exogeneity from 1948-1972 cannot be made about post 1973 data 
when global forces of supply and demand determine prices.  
As long as the political events in the Middle East that cause supply shocks are not 
determined by the business cycle fluctuations in the U.S., the correlation should be 
interpreted as causal (Hamilton 2010). Hamilton (1983) performs a test for Granger 
Causality of oil prices on GDP. Since there may still be a third variable causing both the 
oil prices and the recessions, Hamilton (1983) tests if lagged values of six macro 
15 
 
 
 
aggregate variables in a Sims VAR system  Granger cause oil prices. He argues that if 
Granger Causality is shown and no other macro variables can be proven to predict oil 
price changes, then there is a strong case for causality. The six variables tested were real 
GNP, unemployment rate, U.S. prices, U.S. wages, inflation, and import prices. The only 
statistically significant variable was import prices, but the portion of oil prices driving 
GDP could not be predicted by oil prices. Since there is no evidence of an omitted 
variable driving both oil prices and GDP, the causal view is supported. Kilian (2009) 
disagrees, arguing that real global demand may be driving both U.S. business cycle 
dynamics and oil prices, violating the ceteris paribus condition, . Kilian (2009) also 
cautions against the causal interpretation of Hamilton’s model in the case of 2007-2008 
because the price changes were gradual from 2002-2007 and Hamilton’s model captures 
the effect on average of the sudden shocks.  
2.6 Constructing the model 
 
Using the Hamilton (1983) finding that none of the macroeconomic variables in the Sims 
system Granger cause oil prices, the functional form of the equation can use simply 
lagged values of change in GDP and change in oil prices. The “feedback-free reduced-
form equation” (Hamilton 1983) is 
       yt= a0 + a1yt-1 + a2yt-2 + a3yt-3 + a4yt-4                                                  
(1) 
+ b1ot-1 + b2ot-2 + b3ot-3 + b4ot-4 + ut 
 
2.7 Asymmetry  
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Hooker (1996) argues that after 1973, oil price changes no longer Granger cause GDP 
growth, even when only price increases are used. Mork (1989) ran Hamilton’s equation 
with different coefficients for price increases and price decreases, with the former but not 
the latter showing statistical significance. Hooker, however, using a post-1973 sample 
found a Granger test p-value of 0.42 leading to rejection of Granger Causality for oil 
price increases. The Hooker article, called “What happened to the oil price-
macroeconomy relationship?” was received for publication with the Journal of Monetary 
Economics in March of 1996. In April of 1996, the final version of James Hamilton’s 
article was received for publication. Hamilton’s title was “This is what happened to the 
oil price-macroeconomy relationship”. In only 5 pages, compared with Hooker’s 18, 
Hamilton refuted Hooker’s claim and suggested a new form of asymmetry to solve the 
discrepancy. Hamilton plotted the change in nominal oil prices over time and saw that 
increases often follow even larger decreases. He proposed instead using the percent 
increase over the one year high, since these increases are more likely to affect firms and 
consumers decisions. He calls this value the “net oil price increase,” and if the value in 
period t is not a new one year high, the series is said to be zero. An F-test on the null 
hypothesis that none of the lagged oil values changed after 1973 using the net oil price 
increase, and the F-statistic was 1.71 leading to failure to reject the null hypothesis. 
Lee, Ni and Ratti (1995) used a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model of oil price changes on GDP. The theoretical 
backing for expecting conditional heteroskedasticity is that the shocks will matter more 
when prices have been steady than when they have been volatile. When recent prices are 
volatile an increase is often seen as correcting a previous decrease, but if prices are 
17 
 
 
 
steady, the increase may be taken more seriously by consumers and firms. The model 
essentially divides the oil shock by the recent volatility.  
There was clearly some sort of asymmetry, but the exact nature was unclear. 
Hamilton (2003) used a flexible approach to determine the correct nonlinear specification 
to explain the asymmetry. He found strong evidence supporting the method of Lee, Ni 
and Ratti (1995). He also found strong evidence for a method which uses “net oil price 
increase” as in Hamilton (1996) but instead with only values that exceed the previous 
three-year high. An instrumental variables approach that isolated the five major military 
conflicts in the Middle East performed very similarly to the “net oil price increase” model 
because taking the three-year high filters out almost everything except these events.  The 
number of non-zero observations in the 1947Q1-2010Q4 sample drops from 143 to 39. 
The asymmetry remains a disputed issue in the literature. Edelstein and Kilian 
(2007) found no evidence of asymmetry in response of consumer spending, aggregrate 
unemployment rate, or consumer expectations. Hamilton (2008) believes that the 
significant oil price decreases in 1985-1986 did not cause the subsequent economic 
expansion. Edelstein and Kilian (2007) found symmetrical consumer behavior in 
response to the 1979 oil shock and the 1986 oil price reductions.  
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
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The dataset consist of real GDP and crude oil prices from the first quarter of 1947 to the 
fourth quarter of 2010. My data for Gross Domestic Product used was in real values, 
using 2005 as the base year.18 The measure of oil prices used was the crude oil Producer 
Price Index (PPI) for domestically produced oil, plotted in Figure 3. The monthly values 
are averages of what oil refiners pay for crude oil produced domestically during that 
month. Since the U.S. imports 51% of the crude oil and refined petroleum products it 
uses19, and prices are set by forces of global supply and demand, the PPI for domestic 
crude oil is still an appropriate measure to use. There are many different measures of oil 
prices and the choice can have a profound impact on results. For example, Blanchard and 
Gali (2007) predict that the economic growth in 1980-81 would have been worse if oil 
prices had not risen. Hamilton (2008) points out that their measure of oil prices was the 
price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil which fell during that period, while oil prices 
increased according to all other measures. The crude oil PPI is a nominal value, so 
inflation is not taken into account. Since inflation and GDP growth are related through 
related macroeconomic factors, including inflation weakens the case for oil shocks being 
exogenous. The crude oil PPI values are recorded monthly, so I converted it to a quarterly 
dataset by taking the end values of each quarter. For example, the first quarter value for 
2011 is the crude oil PPI for March. Oil shocks are measured as in Hamilton (2008). Still 
using the monthly data, the previous three year high at each quarter is recorded. Then, if 
the value in quarter t is greater than the three year high, the oil shock is the percentage 
increase from the previous three-year high. This value will hereafter be referred to as the 
net oil price increase. The oil shock is said to be zero if no new three-year high is reached  
                                                     
18
 Source: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/106   
19
 Source: http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/foreign_oil_dependence.cfm  
19 
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during the period. This method is used to focus on the major oil shocks. The drawback of 
using this methodology is that there are only 39 quarters in which an oil shock occurs, so 
the sample size is small. The summary statistics for the 39 shocks are shown in Table 1. 
All of the net oil price increases are shown in the Appendix. 
3.2 Stationarity 
 
In order to make a dependable forecast using time series data, it is often better to look at 
changes rather than levels. If the levels have a trend, then the values before and after a 
given time will have a different joint distribution that depends on the time.20 Such a time 
series is said to be nonstationary, and forecasts will be skewed. A variable must be 
stationary for time series analysis and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is used to 
test for stationary. I conducted ADF tests on both real GDP and crude oil PPI, finding 
both to be nonstationary. However, tests on the difference in natural log of real GDP and 
net oil price increase showed both to be stationary with p-values <0.0000121. The 
variables are now considered to be integrated of order one, or I(1).22  
3.3 Cointegration 
 
Even though the two variables y and o are stationary when integrated of order one, there 
is still a chance that the variables share a common trend. If y – βo is stationary, when β is 
some coefficient, then y and o are cointegrated. I used the EG-ADF test23 for 
cointegration. First I regressed y on o and calculated the residuals. Then I ran an ADF test 
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on the residuals. The p value of the test statistic for the EG-ADF test was <0.00001, 
leading to rejection of the null hypothesis of cointegration.24 Intuitively, this result makes 
sense because it would be surprising to find that GDP growth at time t had a common 
trend with the same period’s net oil price increase which as is largely determined by 
political instability in the Middle East.   
3.4 Lag Selection 
 
In the regressions I am essentially using the lagged values of real GDP growth and net oil 
price increase to forecast real GDP growth. The values of real GDP growth are calculated 
as the difference in natural log between real GDP in period t and t-1, and will hereafter be 
referred to as GDP growth. Equation 1 shows the form of the regression used by 
Hamilton (2008). 
       yt= a0 + a1yt-1 + a2yt-2 + a3yt-3 + a4yt-4                                                  
(1) 
+ b1ot-1 + b2ot-2 + b3ot-3 + b4ot-4 + ut 
Where y is GDP growth, and o is the net oil price increase. The dependent variable is 
GDP growth in quarter t, and the eight explanatory variables are the values of GDP 
growth in the previous four periods and the net oil price increase in the previous four 
periods. To decide the optimal number of lagged values to use, I used the Bayes-
Schwartz Information Criterion (BIC) and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).25  If 
too few lags are used, an important explanatory variable may be left out, and if too many 
are used then unnecessary explanatory variables will increase the inaccuracy of the 
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forecast. Both of these information criteria give information that balance these factors. 
Both the BIC and the AIC suggest a lag length of four.26 The results of the regression, 
shown in Figure 3, show that the fourth lag of oil prices is significant at the 5% level for 
the full sample. Using four lags is consistent with the equation used by Hamilton (2008).  
3.5 Standard Errors 
 
I use Newey-West Standard Errors for the regressions. A White noise Q test tests the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation. Both net oil price increase and GDP growth have a 
Portmanteau (Q) statistic p-value of <0.00001, leading to a rejection of the null. Since 
there is serial correlation and no reason to assume homoskedasticity, I use Newey West 
errors which are consistent for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.   
3.6 Breaks in the Data 
 
Hamilton found that the relationship from 1948-1972 was a poor predictor of the effects 
from the price increases of 1973-1974, because the price increases were roughly three 
times larger than the largest during the 1948-1972 sample. The results for the entire 
sample consequently show much smaller coefficients than the second sample. Hamilton 
(1983) hypothesizes that “changes in expected inflation, the response of monetary policy 
to oil shocks, or the regime in which oil prices are determined” could create the structural 
break. I conducted a Chow test for a structural break starting in 1973Q1 and with a p 
value of 0.0000 rejected the null hypothesis of no break. 
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4. Results 
 
4.1 Regression 
 
As in Hamilton, I estimate the regression beginning in 1949Q2, because during 1947 and 
1948 the post war transition to automobile usage led to an 80% increase in the price of 
crude oil, but this is not the type of oil price variation we are interested in examining.27 
Figure 4 shows the results of the regression. Column 1 is from the full sample from 
1949Q2-2010Q4. Column 2 shows the same results for the early sample period from 
1949Q2-1972Q4, the point at which Hamilton (1983) finds a structural break. I ran a 
Chow test for a structural break at 1973Q1. With the null hypothesis of no break, I found 
an F-stat of 8.49 with a p value of 0.0000 leading to rejection of the null. Column 3 
shows the results for the late sample period from 1973Q1-2010Q4. The form of the 
regression from column 1 is displayed in equation 2 with Newey-West standard errors in 
brackets. 
yt= 0.825 + 0.25yt-1 + 0.12yt-2 – 0.10yt-3 – 0.09yt-4 
                      (0.10)   (0.06)      (0.07)       (0.06)      (0.07)     
                 – 0.02ot-1 – 0.02ot-2 – 0.02ot-3 – 0.02ot-4  
                                                          (0.01)     (0.008)     (0.007)    (0.008) 
 
 The R-squared is 0.23 meaning that 23% of the variation in GDP growth is 
explained by the model. When the four lagged values of GDP growth are taken out, the 
model with only four lagged values of net oil price increase has an R-squared of 0.14. 
The Results with only the net oil price increase are shown in columns 4-6 of Figure 4. 
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4.2 Granger Causality 
The Granger Causality test is applied to determine if a variable’s lagged values have 
predictive power of another variable. The name “Granger causality” is a misnomer in the 
sense that the test does not determine if the dependent variable causes the independent 
variable. Stock and Watson note that a more appropriate name would be “Granger 
predictability” 28 because though it may be useful in forecasting, additional assumptions 
need to be made in order to make a causal interpretation.  Namely, the assumption of 
exogeneity needs to be satisfied. Since the net oil price increase is considered fairly 
exogenous, the results of the Granger Causality test can be interpreted roughly as a test of 
one variable causing the other. 
In the Granger Causality test, the null hypothesis of the F-test is that all four 
lagged values of net oil price increase are insignificant explanatory variables when 
regressed on GDP growth. The F-test p-value is 0.0001 leading to rejection of the null. 
This establishes that net oil price increase Granger causes GDP growth.  
To test whether GDP growth Granger causes net oil price increase, I regressed 
GDP growth on net oil price increase. The null hypothesis that all four lagged values of 
GDP growth are insignificant explanatory variables has an F-Test p-value of 0.55, so the 
null cannot be rejected. Hence, GDP growth does not Granger cause net oil price 
increase.29 
4.3 Impulse Response Functions 
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Table 1. Values of Net Oil Price Increase in During Oil Shocks 
Date Net Oil Price Increase 
1974q1 52.8% 
1979q1 50.7% 
1980q1 34.4% 
1990q1 32.6% 
2007q1 31.8% 
1981q1 24.3% 
2008q3 23.5% 
 
 
A first step for interpreting the above regression is to look at the impulse response 
function for a one standard deviation net oil price increase (Kilian 2009). The standard 
Deviation of net oil price increase is 13.86. For a 13.86% increase in oil prices, the model 
predicts a 1.1% decrease in GDP four quarters later. The actual values of net oil price 
increase during oil shocks are far higher, See Table 1.30 Since we care most about the 
large values, consider that roughly 2 standard deviation net oil price increase of 25% 
yields a 2.0% drop in GDP four quarters later.  
Take for example the largest oil shock in the dataset which resulted from the 
OPEC Embargo in October of 1973. The Crude Oil PPI increased from 19.9 to 24.3 from 
December 1973 to January 1974. In March the figure was 27.5. In my dataset this 
translates to a net oil price increase in 1974Q1 of 52.8%. Figure 4 shows what the model 
from 1949Q1-2010Q4 would predict for the one-year-ahead forecast, compared with the 
actual result. Figures 5-9 show the same results for the other major oil shocks. In each 
graph, the forecast 
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Figure 4. Regression of Net Oil Price Increase and GDP Growth on GDP Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES yt  
(1949Q2- 
2010Q4) 
yt  
(1949Q2- 
1972Q4) 
yt  
(1973Q1- 
20104) 
yt  
(1949Q2- 
2010Q4) 
yt  
(1949Q2- 
1972Q4) 
yt  
(1973Q1- 
20104) 
       
yt-1 0.250*** 0.149** 0.221**    
 (0.0641) (0.0726) (0.0856)    
yt-2 0.118 0.135 0.0913    
 (0.0714) (0.0944) (0.0945)    
yt-3 -0.0972 -0.127* -0.0505    
 (0.0628) (0.0721) (0.0926)    
yt-4 -0.0879 -0.169* 0.0141    
 (0.0714) (0.0976) (0.109)    
ot-1 -0.0207** -0.148*** -0.0185* -0.024** -
0.127*** 
-0.0213** 
 (0.00969) (0.0276) (0.00952) (0.0093) (0.0394) (0.00922) 
ot-2 -0.0192** -0.103** -0.0175** -
0.026*** 
-
0.117*** 
-
0.0235*** 
 (0.00765) (0.0444) (0.00760) (0.0074) (0.0437) (0.00754) 
ot-3 -0.0186*** -0.248*** -0.0142** -
0.026*** 
-
0.291*** 
-
0.0203*** 
 (0.00704) (0.0430) (0.00665) (0.0074) (0.0290) (0.00680) 
ot-4 -0.0202** -0.155 -0.0166** -
0.026*** 
-0.198* -0.0223** 
 (0.00795) (0.118) (0.00828) (0.0092) (0.106) (0.00913) 
Constant 0.825*** 1.251*** 0.706*** 1.02*** 1.277*** 0.963*** 
 (0.0979) (0.157) (0.115) (0.079) (0.133) (0.0773) 
       
Observations 
R2 
Root MSE 
247 
0.230 
0.881 
95 
0.358 
0.979 
152 
0.248 
0.746 
247 
0.139 
.924 
95 
0.270 
1.02 
152 
0.193 
.763 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
is given along with dotted lines for the 95% confidence interval.31 
How accurate is the model at forecasting GDP?  The R2 of 0.24 shows the 
limitations of the model. If the oil shocks are determined exogenously, it provides an  
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Figure 5. Regression of Net Oil Price Increase and GDP Growth on GDP Growth at 
the Time of Each Oil Shock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES yt 
(1949Q2- 
1974Q1) 
yt 
(1949Q2- 
1979Q1) 
yt 
(1949Q2- 
1980Q1) 
yt 
(1949Q2- 
1990Q1) 
yt 
(1949Q2- 
1981Q1) 
yt 
(1949Q2- 
2008Q2) 
       
yt-1 0.219** 0.215*** 0.224*** 0.228*** 0.244*** 0.234*** 
 (0.0861) (0.0759) (0.0775) (0.0695) (0.0771) (0.0637) 
yt-2 0.136 0.0813 0.0892 0.0969 0.0726 0.113 
 (0.108) (0.0958) (0.0928) (0.0786) (0.0889) (0.0727) 
yt-3 -0.0886 -0.0901 -0.0986 -0.103 -0.136* -0.0978 
 (0.0858) (0.0823) (0.0799) (0.0731) (0.0755) (0.0643) 
yt-4 -0.157 -0.184** -0.165* -0.122 -0.129 -0.0994 
 (0.0986) (0.0905) (0.0873) (0.0813) (0.0913) (0.0735) 
ot-1 -0.0413 -0.00852 -0.00782 -0.0256* -0.0211 -0.0167* 
 (0.0303) (0.00891) (0.00621) (0.0144) (0.0132) (0.00947) 
ot-2 0.0725*** -
0.0423*** 
-0.0259* -0.0210* -0.0242** -0.0168** 
 (0.0151) (0.00827) (0.0136) (0.0112) (0.0121) (0.00741) 
ot-3 -0.0508 -0.0319** -
0.0246*** 
-0.0208** -0.0168* -0.0189** 
 (0.0574) (0.0140) (0.00817) (0.00988) (0.00922) (0.00747) 
ot-4 -0.0727** -
0.0469*** 
-
0.0342*** 
-
0.0292*** 
-0.0273** -0.0219** 
 (0.0365) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0114) (0.00845) 
Constant 1.027*** 1.096*** 1.047*** 0.969*** 1.045*** 0.863*** 
 (0.152) (0.149) (0.153) (0.126) (0.154) (0.102) 
       
Observations 
 
100 
0.253 
120 
0.242 
124 
0.223 
164 
0.214 
128 
0.209 
237 
0.201 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
estimate, all else equal, for the path of GDP growth. And since the fourth lagged value of 
net oil price increase is significant at the one percent level, the one-year-ahead forecasts 
could be useful. Figure 5 shows the forecasts of the model up to the time of each oil 
shock. Whereas Figures 6-11 show the impulse response using the model using the 
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information known in 2011, Figures 12-17 show the impulse response functions using the 
information known at time t. Table 2 compares the two sets. 
Figure 6. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to Oil Shock 
of 1974Q1 
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Figure 7. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to Oil Shock 
of 1979Q1 
 
Figure 8. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to Oil Shock 
of 1980Q1 
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Figure 9. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to Oil Shock 
of 1990Q4 
 
Figure 10. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to 
Consecutive Oil Shocks of 1981Q1 and Q2 
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Figure 11. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to 
Consecutive Oil Shocks of 2008Q2 and Q3 
 
Figure 12. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to Oil 
Shock of 1974Q1 with model as of 1974 
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Figure 13. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to Oil 
Shock of 1979Q1 with model as of 1979 
 
Figure 14. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to Oil 
Shock of 1980Q1 with model as of 1980 
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Figure 15. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to Oil 
Shock of 1990Q1 with model as of 1990Q1 
 
Figure 16. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to 
Consecutive Oil Shocks of 1981Q1 and 1981Q2 with model as of 1981Q1
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Figure 17. Forecasted and Actual Response of GDP Growth to 
Consecutive Oil Shocks of 1981Q1 and 1981Q2 with model as of 1981Q1 
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Table 2. One-Year-Ahead Forecasts of Past Oil Shocks: Comparison of 
Performance of the Equation Known in 2011 with the Model known at time of Oil 
Shock 
Date of 
Shocks 
 
Size 
of 
Shoc
k 
One-
Year 
Ahead 
Result 
One-Year 
Ahead 
Forecast 
With Model 
from 
1949Q2-
2010Q4 
(Cumulative 
Percentage 
Change in 
real GDP) 
Forecast 
Error 
(Percentage 
Points) 
One-Year 
Ahead 
Forecast 
With Model 
from 
1949Q2- 
Time of 
Shock 
(Cumulative 
Percentage 
Change in 
real GDP) 
Forecast 
Error 
(Percentag
e Points) 
1974 Q1 52.7
% 
-2.36% -4.13% 1.8 -4.87% 2.5 
1979 Q1 50.7
% 
1.4% -4.0% 5.4 -6.6% 8.0 
1980 Q1 34.4
% 
1.6% -2.7% 4.3 -3.2% 4.8 
1981 Q1 
1981 Q2 
24.3
% 
7.1% 
-2.5% -2.3% 0.2 -2.6 0.1 
1990 Q4 14.8
% 
1.0% -1.2% 2.2 -1.4% 2.4 
2008 Q2 
2008 Q3 
20.6
% 
23.4
% 
4.2% -3.0% 1.2 -2.8% 1.4 
 
Average 
 
   2.5  3.2 
Average 
Excluding 
1979 and 
1980 
   1.4  1.6 
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5. Discussion 
 
5.1 Extension to 2011 Oil Shock 
 
On April 11, 2011 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) lowered its forecast for 2011 
U.S. nominal GDP growth from 3.0% to 2.8%, largely due to the increasing price of oil.32  
The PPI for December 2010 (the fourth quarter value in my sample) is 242.0, and the 
value increases 17% to 283.5 in March 2011 (the third quarter value in my sample). 
Figure 18 shows the cumulative change in real GDP following a 17% net oil price 
increase. Using the model with Hamilton’s definition of an oil shock, there will be no 
shock until prices reach 384.3, the July 2008 value. However, this definition was created 
so that only large oil shocks are examined. Since prices dropped so drastically after July 
2008, the March 2011 value is only a two and a half year high. I include the shock 
nonetheless. Three quarters after the shock represents the end of 2011. All else equal, 
given that the oil price rose 17% from 2010Q4 to 2011Q1, we expect to see real GDP 
lower by almost a percent. The 95% confidence interval runs from -0.26% to -2.4%. The 
IMF projected decline of expected GDP growth, therefore, is outside the upper bound of 
the predicted effect based on my model.   If there is a subsequent 10% spike in the second 
quarter, the model predicts a 1.3% decline corresponding to 1.7% GDP growth for 2011. 
 
                                                     
32
 Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-11/imf-cuts-2011-u-s-growth-forecast-on-oil-
lackluster-pace-of-job-gains.html  
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Figure 18. Forecasted Response of GDP Growth to Oil Shocks of 
2011Q1 
 
Figure 19. Forecasted Response of GDP Growth to Oil Shocks of 
2011Q1 Followed by Hypothetical 10% Shock in 2011Q2
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Retail gas prices have continued to rise up to the publication date. Since the U.S. 
is coming out of a recession it is reasonable to expect demand to continue to rise, and the 
falling dollar makes it even more probable that prices will continue to rise for 
Americans.33 If crude oil PPI rises 54% this quarter, the model predicts growth will 
decline by 3 percentage points, see Figure 20. Using the IMF forecast of 3% as of 
2011Q1, this translates to zero growth. Since the fourth lag of the second shock would 
take effect in the first quarter of 2012, the model would predict a second quarter with 
negative growth, constituting a recession.   
Figure 20. Forecasted Response of GDP Growth to Oil Shocks of 
2011Q1 Followed by Hypothetical 57% Shock in 2011Q2 
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5.2 Limitations of the Methods 
 
There are several significant limitations to the methods used in this paper. First, 
there are only five major oil exogenous shocks in the sample and the net oil price increase 
above the three year high only has 39 non-zero observations. There may be important 
variables omitted such as energy intensity (Kilian 2008) and wage flexibility (Blinder 
2009). The end of an expansionary period may cause higher demand for oil, raising 
prices. Then the oil prices and output decline are simultaneous, but both caused by a third 
factor. (Hamilton 2008). One of those potential factors that Kilian (2008) proposes is 
global real activity. This variable is of particular interest for the debate about the causes 
of the 1973-4 oil shock. Hamilton (2003) argues that the price increases were mostly 
driven by the calculated political decisions of the Arab members of OPEC. Kilian (2008), 
however, constructs a measure of global real demand, based on shipping rates of cargo 
and claims that the price increases had to do in large part with an economic calculation.34  
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have looked at the one-year-ahead forecasts of GDP growth based on oil 
shocks. For the sample period 1949Q2-2010Q4, four previous quarter’s values of the net 
oil price increases explain 14% of the variation in GDP growth during time t. 
Considering that many factors influence GDP growth, this value is economically 
                                                     
34
 Hamilton’s response comes in three parts. First the price of a barrel of oil went from $3.01 to $11.65 
from October to January as OPEC instituted the embargo. It is unlikely that the calculation would lead to 
such a large price increase at exactly that time. Second, it is unlikely that the Arab members of OPEC and 
nonArab members reached different calculations of demand. And lastly, the embargo was fueled largely by 
Egypt and Syria who were not oil producing nations, but rather just the most vehemently anti-Israel 
nations. 
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significant. The forecast error of the model was 8 percentage points and 4.8 percentage 
points for 1979 and 1980 respectively. For the other three shocks, the model was off by 
1.6 percentage points on average. What gives the results strength is that the fourth lag is 
significant at the 5% level for all specifications, and the standard errors are relatively 
small as most of the lagged variables are significant. Therefore, the model gives a 
prediction of, all else equal, what the likely path of GDP growth will be.  
 The results in this paper have significant implications for monetary policy makers. 
In 2008Q1, the Federal Reserve rapidly decreased interest rates, concerned about a 
weakening economy. Frankel (2008) argues that low real interest rates are correlated with 
high real commodity prices. He asserts that when real interest rates are low, the 
opportunity cost of keeping large inventories of commodities goes down. The increased 
demand will then cause the price to be artificially high until the market realizes that the 
commodities are overvalued. Hamilton (2009) points out that Fed Chairman Ben 
Bernanke was focused on the longer term picture that the U.S. economy needed demand 
stimulated, and that commodity prices would decline once global demand slowed. 
However, if Frankel (2008) is right, than the monetary policy reaction increased the oil 
prices. My model then, predicts that high oil prices contributed to the severity of the 
recession in the subsequent four quarters. Hamilton (2009) and Frankel (2008) note that 
the Federal Reserve then may have decreased the severity of the recession, had it more 
strongly considered the effects of short term oil price increases. If the economy goes into 
another recession as my model predicts following a 54% net oil price increase in 2011Q2, 
monetary policymakers may pay more attention to controlling oil prices this time around. 
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Appendix 
 
1.Oil Shocks from 1949-2010 with the Major Oil Shocks Highlighted 
Quarter Net Oil Price Increase 
1948-I 5.5 
1953-I 10.5 
1956-I 0.8 
1957-I 9.4 
1966-I 0.7 
1967-I 0.7 
1968-I 0.7 
1969-I 5.1 
1970-I 6.2 
1971-I 1.3 
1973-I 27.6 
1974-I 52.8 
1974-IV 1.0 
1975-I 16.6 
1976-I 0.8 
1977-I 8.9 
1978-I 8.4 
1979-I 50.7 
1980-I 34.4 
1981-I 24.3 
1981-II 7.1 
1989-I 3.5 
1990-I 32.6 
1990-IV 14.8 
1996-I 22.0 
1999-I 0.1 
2000-I 11.0 
2000-II 10.3 
2000-III 3.3 
2000-IV 8.5 
2004-I 14.3 
2004-IV 8.8 
2005-I 37.4 
2005-IV 5.4 
2006-III 9.3 
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2007-I 31.8 
2008-II 20.6 
2008-III 23.4 
2011-1 17.1 
 
2.Oil shock Summary Statistics 
Observations: 39 
Mean: 13.6 
Standard Deviation: 13.9 
Min: 0.1 
Max: 52.8 
 
3.Variable Definition 
GDP Growth: difference in natural log of GDP between t and t-
1 (referred to in paper as GDP growth) 
Net Oil Price Increase: Percentage increase above previous 
three year high. If no new three year high is set, value is zero. 
Crude oil PPI: Quarter end value of crude oil PPI 
Natural log of real GDP:  Natural log of real GDP in 2005 
years at time t 
 
4. Results of EG-ADF test for cointegration between GDP Growth and Net Oil Price 
Increase 
Test Statistic for test of Cointegration: -7.8 Mackinnon approximate p-value for Z(t): 
0.0000 
 
5. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test results for natural log of real GDP and GDP 
growth 
Test Statistic for Natural log of GDP: -1.1 Mackinnon approximate p-value for Z(t): 0.72 
Test Statistic for Net Oil Price Increase: - 
10.8 
Mackinnon approximate p-value for Z(t): 
0.0000 
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6. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test results for crude oil PPI and the net oil price 
increase 
Test Statistic for Crude Oil PPI: -2.6 Mackinnon approximate p-value for Z(t): 0.09 
Test Statistic for Net Oil Price Increase: -
15.8 
Mackinnon approximate p-value for Z(t): 
0.0000 
 
7. Lag Selection Test Leading to Selection of 4 Lags 
Lag Length AIC BIC 
2 676.69 694.38 
3 668.94 693.68 
4 661.51 693.28 
5 660.2077 698.9877 
 
8. Granger Causality Test for Null Hypothesis that net oil price increase does not 
cause GDP Growth 
F-Statistic: 8.03 
Prob > F: 0.0001 
 
9. Granger Causality Test for Null Hypothesis that GDP Growth does not cause Net 
Oil Price Increase 
F-Statistic: 1.60 
Prob > F: 0.55 
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